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31 Introduction
For a long time, many Germans did not consider their country as a mayor destination for immi-
grants. However, in 2005 7.3 million people or 8.9 percent of the population were foreigners.
Using a broader deﬁnition of migration by looking at people with a migration background, e.g.
someone whose parents immigrated to Germany, then at the end of 2005 there were 15.3 Million
such people living in Germany. This corresponds to 18.6 percent of the population.1
However, with regard to labour-market performance, migrants generally fare less well than Ger-
mans without a migration background. For example, the unemployment rate of foreigners in
2005 was 25.2 percent which was more than twice the rate for Germans which was “only” 11.9
percent (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2007: Table 7.2).2 One of the key factors to labour-market
success as in all highly industrialised countries such as Germany is undoubtedly the level of edu-
cation a person has. In 2005, the unemployment rate of individuals with no vocational training
was 26.0 percent, whereas it was only 4.1 percent for those with a degree from university or
technical college (Reinberg/Hummel 2007).
Due to data limitations, the vast majority of studies for migrants in Germany are based on an
analysis of people of different nationalities. However, Germany has also received a substantial
amount of migration of so-called Ethnic Germans ((Spät-)Aussiedler) who often grew up for
example in Poland, Romania or the former Soviet Union but have German roots and are hence
allowed to migrate to Germany. Between 1990 and 2004 roughly 2.5 million Ethnic Germans
migrated to Germany. They receive German citizenship immediately after crossing the German
border which entitles them to an unrestricted access to the German labour market. Due to their
German citizenship, the Ethnic Germans can normally not be unambiguously identiﬁed in the
data. The exception are studies based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) (see for
example, Aldashev/Gernandt/Thomsen 2007, Constant/Massey 2003, Kreyenfeld/Konietzka 2001,
Licht/Steiner 1994 or Riphahn 2002, 2003, 2005). Unfortunately, for our purposes, the GSOEP
does not have detailed enough information on the labour market. Instead, we create a com-
pletely new and extremely rich dataset based on administrative data from the German Federal
Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit - FEA).
This paper analyses the effects of education signals for Ethnic Germans and Germans without a
migration background (“Native germans”) respectively. Intuitively, one might expect that, after
controlling for other personal as well as occupational characteristics, the wage paid to people
with the same (formal) education level but different migration backgrounds should be the same.
Our results clearly show that this is not the case. We ﬁnd substantial and robust differences
between Ethnic and Native Germans with equal and high formal education levels.
Generally, there are two main explanations in the economics of education literature for the
positive link between the level of education and wages: the human capital theory based on Becker
(1975) and the signalling/screening (collectively known as sorting) theory which was originally
developed by Spence (1973, 1974). Human capital theory focuses on the productivity augmenting
1 All of the above ﬁgures come from Statistisches Bundesamt (2007: Table 1).
2 These rates can only be calculated based on the number of civil employees. Hence, for example, the self-employed
are not included. As a result, these rates are higher than ofﬁcial unemployment rates.
4effects associated with education. Sorting theory assumes that the educational level signals
certain characteristics that a person has. For example, if an employer knows from past experience
that highly-educated individuals have more innate ability, then this is a characteristic that he or
she cannot directly observe when hiring the employee but is willing to reward if he or she is able
to obtain the information indirectly. This information is inferred from educational signals which
act as a proxy for expected productivity.
It is often argued that sorting theories assume no productivity enhancing effects of education.
To this extent there is a huge amount of literature which tries to test which of the two theories
is correct by trying to separate empirically the purely productive enhancing effects of education
(which are then assumed to support the human-capital theory) or the purely sorting effects of
education in which education is assumed to leave productivity unaltered but is associated with
other positive characteristics.3
We want to stress the point that there is no reason to assume that there are no productivity
enhancing effects of education in sorting models. Therefore, in Section 2 we present a sorting
model which explicitly takes such effects into account. Both the sorting model and the human
capital approach imply that wages rise with the level of education. Therefore, as both human
capital models and sorting models predict the same empirical result Brown/Sessions (1999) argue
convincingly that it is – especially for empirical purposes – quite redundant whether education
augments skills or signals innate abilities. Along similar lines, Lang (1994: p. 353) states, “the
distinguishing characteristic of a sorting model is that knowing an individual’s education pro-
vides employers with information about that individual’s productivity which would be unknown
otherwise.”
In our view and as originally expressed in Weiss (1995), sorting theory in no way contradicts
human-capital theory. On the contrary, there are numerous similarities between the two: In
both theories wages are paid according to marginal productivity, ﬁrms maximise their proﬁts and
individuals their utility, the marginal beneﬁt of education equals the marginal costs and, as can
be seen from the model in Section 2, in both cases more education is associated with higher
productivity. However, whereas human-capital theory tries to isolate the effects of education on
productivity solely due to differences in education (and not differences in, for example, innate
abilities), sorting theory implies:
“...if workers’ productivities are in fact not perfectly observed (which is particularly true
for newly hired workers), then the ﬁrms would have to infer the productivities [...] from
3 For example, there are studies based on comparisons between workers in dependent employment and self-em-
ployed people in terms of years of schooling published by Wolpin (1977), Riley (1979), Katz/Ziderman (1980),
Fredland/Little (1981), Tucker (1985), Cohn/Kiker/Mendes de Oliveira (1987), Grubb (1993), Alba-Ramirez/Segundo
(1995), Brown/Sessions (1999, 1998), Lofstrom (2000), van der Sluis/van Praag (2004), Castagnetti/Chelli/Rosti
(2005) and Garcia-Mainar/Montuenga-Gómez (2005). Psacharopoulos (1979, 1983), Lee (1980), Tucker (1986) and
Cohn/Kiker/Mendes de Oliveira (1987) compare the rates of return to schooling between the competitive and the
non-competitive sectors of an economy. Liu/Wong (1982) measure the effect of tenure. Alba-Ramirez/Segundo
(1995), Arabsheibani/Rees (1998) and Brown/Sessions (1999) ground their research on comparisons between pu-
blic and private sector workers. The decomposition of earnings is studied by Tucker (1985). Albrecht (1981) and
Albrecht/van Ours (2006) analyse the relationship between the returns to schooling and job information. Studies
using data of identical twins have been published by Miller/Mulvey/Martin (1995, 2004). Wiles (1974), Miller/Volker
(1984) and Arabsheibani (1989) base their analysis on comparisons between the salaries of workers in occupations
relevant to their educational qualiﬁcation to those with the same qualiﬁcation working in jobs not directly related
to their qualiﬁcations.
5noisysignalssuchasinterviews,tryouts,andreferenceletterstogetherwiththeireducation
levels.” Fang (2006: 1154)
I.e. as already mentioned above, ﬁrms need to form expectations about productivities based
solely upon observable characteristics. This in turn has important implications for our empirical
analysis as what we are wanting to estimate is not the rate of return on education. Instead, it
is the ex ante employer beliefs about how innate abilities are related to education and hence
productivity. Thus, sorting theory implies that:
“The coefﬁcient on education is fully capturing the effects of that inference process and
would not be affected by the inclusion of additional explanatory variables that are not ob-
served by the ﬁrm. Even if the researcher knows the results of accurate tests of attributes
like perseverance or a taste for additional learning, if the ﬁrm does not have that direct in-
formation available, then the sorting model predicts that including these variables in the
wage equation will not affect the coefﬁcient on schooling” (Weiss 1995: p. 135f.).
This theoretical implication is also in line with the huge body of evidence on the rates of return
to education (see Card 2001 for a comprehensive survey). Table II in his article shows that the
difference in the coefﬁcients on education between OLS estimates (which do not take unobser-
vable innate abilities into account) and IV estimates (which do try to take them into account)
can be small and not signiﬁcant.4 Recently, Gebel/Pfeiffer (2007) have also estimated returns to
education and compared OLS with the conditional mean independence approach developed by
Wooldridge (2004). Again, although there are some differences in the two results, the general
picture between the two is very similar.
The objective of this paper is therefore not to prove whether the sorting or human-capital ap-
proach prevails and to which extent both theories apply. Hence, we do not want to further
contribute to this long debate. As, however, it is broadly accepted that education in any case also
has a signalling value, we will compare whether this signalling value differs between a distinct
group of migrants and non-migrants in the German labour market. To the best of our knowledge,
this comparison approach has never been performed yet. Our focus is on the starting wage of
a person, i.e. at a time when the employer cannot observe (much) more than the researcher.
At this stage of the wage-bargaining process, the education level acts as a signal about the
expected productivity of a potential employee. This means that it contains the sum of productiv-
ity enhancing effects due to education and the expected characteristics (which indirectly affect
productivity) that are associated with such education levels.
Our paper is structured as follows: In the next section we present the theoretical model from
which we derive our hypothesis that we then want to test empirically. We describe our data in
Section 3 before presenting the estimation results in Section 4. Section 5 provides our conclu-
sions.
4 In general, the coefﬁcients obtained from the IV estimates are higher. However, as pointed out in the article this
may be because the IV estimator depends crucially on the assumption that the instruments are uncorrelated with
other latent characteristics of individuals that may affect their earnings. In addition, measurement error in the
schooling variable causes a downward bias in OLS estimates (see Griliches 1977 or Angrist/Krueger 1991) but not
necessarily in IV estimates.
62 Screening with Productivity Enhancing Effects of Education
Starting point of the analysis is a general theoretical model of screening with productivity en-
hancing effects of education (cf. Hirshleifer/Riley 1992: ch. 11). We assume that there are two
types of individuals which differ with respect to their innate abilities p, where p = H denotes
high and p = L denotes low ability, i.e. H > L. Net utility of an individual is
U (w;s;) = w   C (s;) (1)
For simplicity, net utility U is assumed to increase linearly in the wage w and decrease in the
perceived cost of education C. As usual, this perceived cost increases convexly with the signalled
level of education s and decreases with innate ability . Hence, individuals with a higher innate
ability require a smaller increment in income to be willing to increase their education level. This
also implies that high ability individuals have ﬂatter indifference curves in the (s;w)-space.
It is often assumed in sorting models that education only has a signalling value and no direct
effect on productivity. However, there is no reason and no need for this assumption (see, for
example, Spence 1974, Weiss 1983, Lang 1994). With such productivity enhancing effects of
education, the net value of production  of a ﬁrm also depends on both s and . Hence, the net
value of production can be written as
 (w;s;) = P (s;)   w (2)
where P (s;) denotes the marginal product of a worker with an education signal s and an
innate ability .
Figure 1 shows the equilibria when there are two types of workers who differ in their innate





H) shown by points A and B, respectively. In these points,
the respective zero-proﬁt (i.e. we assume perfect competition as usual) and indifference curves
are tangential. In this case, with perfect information, there is no signalling effect, i.e. the signal
s simply reﬂects the productivity level of an applicant. Hence, no party could improve its position
without either a decrease in utility or losses by the ﬁrms. At the same time, as points A and B




If the two types cannot be distinguished by the employer, i.e. we have imperfect information,
type L workers would prefer a type H contract in which their indifference curve would then go
through point B which is associated with a higher net utility level. However, ﬁrms would make
a loss if they paid both type L and H workers the high productivity wage w
H. Therefore, ﬁrms
have an interest in separating the two types and will hence not offer the contract (s
H;w
H).
Figure 2 shows the case of a separating equilibrium with imperfect information. In order to
prevent type L-workers from mimicking the workers with a high innate ability, ﬁrms will now
continue to offer type L workers the contract (s
L;w
L). However, the contract for type H
workers is now (ss
H;ws
H), i.e. in going from an equilibrium with perfect to one with imperfect
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Figure 1: Perfect Information Contracts with Two Types of Workers
move from point B to point C in Figure 2. With such a contract pair, type L workers are just
indifferent between contracts A and C. Hence, high-ability workers have to signal marginally
above ss
H in order to really separate themselves from the low-ability workers. The type H workers
incur a negative externality, as they need to invest in a higher signal level than is the case under
perfect information. Hence, their utility decreases from U
H to Us
H.
However, as shown in Figure 3, depending on the relative productivities (and shares of the two
typesofworkers), aseparatingsolutionmaynotrepresentanequilibrium. Forexample, bothtypes
of workers prefer a pooling contract with wages of or above ~ wHL. If the average productivity of
the two types of workers is higher than this wage, then the scope of possible pooling contracts is
given by the shaded area BCD in Figure 3. As an educational level of at least s
H is required to
reach the productivity level at which ﬁrms can pay ~ wHL without making a loss, this signalling-
level marks the lower bound of the shaded area. The upper bound is again the signal Ss
H as this
is the level after which typ-L workers would then prefer a separating contract.
However, Rothschild/Stiglitz (1976) show that – with competition amongst ﬁrms – it is no longer
possible to determine a unique pooling equilibrium which is stable. This can be seen from Figure
4 which is an enlargement of the relevant area in Figure 3. For example, if one ﬁrm were to offer
a contract as shown by point D, then another ﬁrm could offer a contract to the north-east of D
such as the wage-signal combination shown by point Q, in which both type H and L workers
reach a higher utility. The range for such pooling equilibria is limited to the right by U0
L, i.e.
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Figure 2: Imperfect Information Separating Contracts for Two Types of Workers
signal-combination in which there would be a pooling equilibrium. However, point Q cannot be a
stable pooling equilibrium, as ﬁrms could react and offer a contract-point R. As compared to D,
type H workers would increase but type L workers decrease their utility level. Therefore, only the
high-ability workers would prefer this contract. In this case, the competitor originally offering
the contract point Q would now make a loss as only the low-ability individuals would stay in the
ﬁrm with productivities below the wage associated with Q. At the same time, ﬁrms offering R
would make positive proﬁts as they only employ high-ability workers with productivities higher
than the wage associated with R. Even if then another ﬁrm were to offer a higher wage than
the reactive ﬁrm, the ﬁrm paying R would “only” lose its workers and end up making zero proﬁts
but would not incur any losses. Therefore, in the potential pooling equilibria range BDU0
L,
there is always the possibility for competitors to react by offering new contracts which make the
original offers unproﬁtable. Engers/Fernandez (1987) show that in such a case there will only be
one unique “reactive equilibrium” and that in this equilibrium there will be offered two separate
contracts for the two types of workers. Hence, no pooling equilibria can exist and there is only
the separating equilibrium as originally shown by points A and C in Figure 2.
A very important conclusion out of this theoretical analysis for the following empirical research is
that, in contrast to many models of imperfect information, in our case there is no room for both
pooling and separating equilibria. As we showed that only one separating equilibrium can exist,
we should observe separating behaviour on the labour market. Hence, we derive the following
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Figure 3: Imperfect Information with Pooling Contract for Two Types of Workers
1. There is always either a separating or reactive equilibrium, i.e. there will always be different
contracts for people with different signal levels. Hence, we expect that the coefﬁcients for
the various education levels differ signiﬁcantly. This should hold both for the Ethnic as
well as native Germans.
2. If employers associate a lower productivity with foreign degrees than for degrees obtained
in the home country, then their zero-proﬁt curves will be lower for foreign education
signals.5 In this case, a person with a degree from abroad will receive a lower wage than a
person with the same formal degree stemming from the home country.
3. If it is true that low-skilled occupations do not require formal qualiﬁcations, we expect that
the wages associated with the low-ability individuals (i.e. people who invest in the lowest
education signal which in the empirical research below is equivalent to “no vocational
training”) be the same. Hence, we want to the test whether the coefﬁcient of the low-
education signal is the same across the two groups.
4. If both hypothesis 2. and 3. hold, then the difference in the coefﬁcients between low- and
high-skilled Native Germans should be higher than the corresponding difference for the
Ethnic Germans.
5 This attitude could be caused for example by risk-averse employers or by experience from past hirings.














Figure 4: Imperfect Information with Pooling Contract and Reactive Equilibrium for Two Types of
Workers
3 Data and Descriptives
Until recently, in ofﬁcial German statistics only the nationality was recorded. As Ethnic Germans
obtain the German nationality as soon as they migrate to Germany, this meant that it was more
or less impossible to identify them in ofﬁcial statistics. Hence, research used either the German
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) or qualitative research methods to analyse this migration group.
However, the GSOEP does not contain enough labour-market information for our purposes. Par-
ticularly, the GSOEP is an annual household panel. Hence, it is not possible to identify all new
jobs a person begins within a year. However, as will be made clearer below, it is the starting wage
in a new job which is of primary interest here.
Instead, we use the rich administrative data set from the German Federal Employment Agency
(FEA) for our analysis. This data is converted to the so-called “Integrated Employment Biogra-
phies” (Integrierte Erwerbsbiograﬁe – IEB) by the Institute for Employment Research, Germany
which is afﬁliated with the FEA. With this data it is possible to observe all times in which a
person is:
either registered as unemployed or as a job-seeker (who can, for example, be simultane-
ously employed),
is entitled to welfare beneﬁts administered by the FEA,
participates in an active labour-market programme administered by the FEA,
11is employed either in a job which is liable to social-security contributions or in a so-called
“Mini-Job” in which the individual earns a maximum of 400 e per month without having
to pay social-security contributions.
Thus, with this data set we are able to observe on a daily basis the transition from either unem-
ployment or programme participation to a new job, or if a person remains employed but changes
the company.
We use this data set to create a completely new database for Ethnic Germans which overcomes
the difﬁculties mentioned above with the other data on this migration group. Within the IEB
there are several means of identifying Ethnic Germans:
1. A person is registered unemployed or as a job-seeker after January 1st. 2000.6
2. A person receives “Eingliederungsgeld” – a special welcome payment to Ethnic Germans.7
3. A person participates in a special German language course designed for Ethnic Germans.
We only need to identify a person as an Ethnic German by one of these methods and at one point
in time. As a person always has the same “customer-number” in all spells of the data, it is then
simply possible to transmit the information containing the migration status to all other spells of
that person.
As our dataset is completely new, we need to see how representative it is for the group of Ethnic
Germans. Since for 2005 it is possible to at least estimate the number of Ethnic Germans using
the German microcensus (the yearly 1 % ofﬁcial household survey in Germany), we compare the
number of 25 to under 55 year olds (the age group of interest in our subsequent analysis) as
measured by the microcensus with the number of Ethnic Germans we are able to identify for this
age group using our dataset. This is shown in Table 1. As can be seen from the Table, we manage
Table 1: Number of 25 to under 55 year olds in the IEB and Microcensus
Number Coverage
IEB Microcensus 2005 Rate
(1990 – 2004) (1949 – 2005) (in %)
972083 1090378 89.2
to identify a very high percentage of the Ethnic Germans. It needs to be noted though that the
comparison needs to be interpreted with caution. First, Ethnic Germans are not unambiguously
identiﬁable inthe Microcensusso thatthe ﬁgureis basedon estimationsusing thisdata.8 Second,
the number of people are counted in 2004 in the IEB but in 2005 in the microcensus. Third, in the
IEB we can only identify Ethnic Germans migrating in 1990 or later whereas the microcensus also
6 To a certain extent, we are also able to identify Ethnic Germans via this method who were unemployed prior to
this date. However, this is only the case if the “customer number” used internally can be uniquely linked to an
individual. Often this number was deleted in the records once the person had found a job and subsequently given
to a different person. As of January 1st. 2000, the customer number is always unique.
7 In fact, migrants from the former East Germany were also eligible to this payment. However, we can explicitly
differentiate between these and Ethnic Germans as we only use this identiﬁcation strategy if the payment was
made after July 1st 1990, a time at which it was no longer made to people coming from former East Germany.
8 We thank Holger Seibert from the IAB for performing this estimation for us.
12counts people immigrating as far back as 1949. Hence, although a perfect comparison cannot be
made, the coverage rate is so high that we feel sure that we have a representative and almost
complete sample of the Ethnic Germans.
In the following, we compare the signalling effects of education between Ethnic and Native
Germans. For this purpose, we use our data on the Ethnic Germans as described above and, in
order to obtain a ﬁle which is still manageable, we use a representative subsample of 2 % of all
Native Germans actively participating on the German labour market in the same age group.
As stated in the introduction, we are interested in measuring the value associated with different
educational signals for the two groups we are considering: Ethnic and Native Germans. Therefore,
our focus is looking on the starting wage of a person, i.e. at a time when the employer cannot
observe (much) more than the researcher. At this stage of the wage-bargaining process, the
education level acts as a signal about the expected productivity of a potential employee. This
means that it contains the sum of productivity enhancing effects due to education and the
expected characteristics that are associated with such education levels.
The IEB only has data on average daily wages. If the employment spell begins and ends in the
same year, the average is simply calculated as gross wage income divided by the number of
days worked for the employer.9 If the employment spell ends in a later year, then the average
is calculated with regard to the income and number of days worked in the year in which the
employment spell started.10 This means that we face a trade-off with regard to the time length
in which we consider the wage to be a “starting-wage”: The shorter we deﬁne the time interval,
the less people will be in our sample. However, the longer we choose this period to be, the more
our wage might differ from that paid at the beginning. Here, we base our wage on a maximum of
the ﬁrst six months of an employment spell.11 The means of calculating the average daily wage
leads to two potential cases which we observe: Either the person starts a new job towards the
end of a year, i.e. during the last six months of a year, or the job begins and ends within one year
and only lasts for a maximum of six months. However, the latter case with only relatively short
job durations is likely to be a special subsample of new jobs. Therefore, to begin with, we restrict
our analysis to jobs starting in the second half of the year and will later investigate whether this
has an effect on the results.
We identify starting wages either if a person has a prior unemployment spell or is participating
in an active labour-market programme. If a person directly moves from one job to the next then
we can identify this change by a change in the plant number. However, we are not able to tell
whether this new job is with a new company or simply a new job with the old company but at a
9 The annual or monthly wages used to calculate the average are in fact right-censored as only a wage up to the
maximum contribution to the social security system is considered. However, less than two percent of our sample
where affected by this restriction. Performing censored regression analysis does not alter the ﬁndings. We also
drop spells from our analysis in which the daily wage is less than 20,- e. as this implies a monthly wage of under
400,- e. Such so-called “Mini-Jobs” are subject to special regulations.
10 For administrative reasons, every employer has to make at least one declaration per year to the social security
system for each employee. Hence, if an employee works for the same ﬁrm for several years, then in the ﬁrst year
the average is only calculated for the days worked in that year. In subsequent years, the average is calculated based
on the annual income in that year and the number of days in the year.
11 We also performed our analysis for starting wages based on three months. This does not alter our results substan-
tially (cf. Table 6 below).
13different location. Hence, we impose the restriction that there must be a gap of at least one day
between job to job changes.12
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics of how this wage is distributed across the education
levels as well as between Ethnic and Native Germans.13
Table 2: Distribution of the Wage by Educational Level and Group
No vocational Vocational Univ.
training training degree
Ethnic Germans
Mean wage 3.76 3.88 3.99
N 61,002 123,231 14,545
Share (in %) 30.69 61.99 7.32
Native Germans
Mean wage 3.78 3.95 4.42
N 12,225 65,069 10,225
Share (in %) 13.97 74.35 11.68
It can immediately be seen from the table that there are marked differences between the two
groups. The mean starting wage of highly qualiﬁed Ethnic Germans is more than 40 % lower
than the corresponding wage for the Native Germans. Also the distribution of the educational
levels differs substantially. There are (in relative terms) more than twice as many Ethnic Germans
with no vocational training. The share of Native Germans with a university degree is more than
1.5 times higher.
Information on educational degrees is also of great importance for our analysis. This information
stems from employers. However, as no ﬁnancial payments depend on this report, it seems to be
slightly unreliable (cf. Fitzenberger/Osikominu/Völter 2005). Hence, we use information about
a person´s education level from other spells in the IEB to try and get a more plausible report
on education. More precisely, since a person generally has to show his certiﬁcates to a place-
ment ofﬁcer at the job center, we use the education information from unemployment spells and
transmit this to all subsequent spells in which education information is missing. If there is still no
information about a person’s educational degree, we see if there is information in an employment
spell and replace as many missings as possible.
Table 2 highlights the fact, that there are large differences between Ethnic and Native Germans
with respect to the distribution of their educational levels. The share of Ethnic Germans with no
vocational training is more than twice as high as for the Native Germans. Similarly, the share of
Native Germans with a university degree is over 50 % higher than the share for Ethnic Germans.
When trying to measure the effect of education signals on wage we obviously need to take
further personal and occupational characteristics into account. The main explanatory variables
we include (besides dummies for time and branch of occupation) are age, sex, labour-market
12 In theory, people changing jobs within one company should not have a gap at all between their employment spells.
However, sometimes employers seem to register their new employees with a minor delay when they change plants.
13 We deﬁne “university degrees” as degrees from universities and universities of applied studies.
14experience, the size of the ﬁrm and the commuting distance. Table 3 shows how these variables
are distributed between the two groups.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Main Exogenous Variables
Total Labour-market Proportion Firm Commuting
Age labour-market experience female size distance
experience in branch
Ethnic Germans
Mean 37.43 2.84 0.45 0.32 235.02 36.31
Std. error of mean 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 2.63 0.19
Native Germans
Mean 30.89 5.1 0.83 0.40 484.77 52.53
Std. error of mean 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 9.19 0.37
There are two ways by which we control for labour-market experience in Germany. As Germany
in general has a fairly occupationally segregated labour market, we include both the absolute
amount of labour-market experience as well as the amount of labour-market experience in the
same branch (on a two-digit-level) as the new job.14
We further control for ﬁrm size and local labour-market conditions. As shown in Ammermül-
ler/Kuckulenz/Zwick (2006), these conditions can have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the wage a
person receives. In addition, this effect differs for people of different skill levels. Hence, we
include the local unemployment rate in our regressions.
As it is well known that women generally receive lower wages than men and that large ﬁrms pay
more than smaller ones, we also include these variables in the regression analysis.
Finally, we take the commuting distance into account. On the one hand, longer commuting
distances might require higher wages as a compensation for the higher travel costs. On the
other hand, commuting might also be a signal as to how motivated an employee is, i.e. long
commuting might signal high motivation.15 In order to avoid distortions in the wage caused by
people working part-time or participating in a labour-market programme, we will only consider
individuals with full-time unsubsidised jobs.
4 Results
The aim of this section is to test the theoretical hypothesis listed on page 8. To this extent, we
estimate the following earnings equation:
lnwijt = 1j + 2jeduc2ijt + 3jeduc3ijt + 4jageijt + 5jage2
ijt + 6jlm_expijt
14 Ideally we would also like to include the branch an Ethnic German worked in (or was trained in) before he or
she immigrated to Germany. As Kreyenfeld/Konietzka (2002) have shown, for Ethnic Germans it makes a large
difference whether they can work in the same sector as in their destination country or not. Unfortunately, our data
does not include information about work or training outside of Germany.
15 The dataset includes the district where a person lives and works. Since many districts are large, we observe the
same district and hence zero commuting distance for over 50 % of our sample. Therefore, we took the minimum
positive commuting distance in our dataset and imposed this ﬁctitious distance for people living and working in
the same district.
15+ 7jlm_exp2
ijt + 8jrel_sec_expijt + 9jfemaleijt + 10jfirm_sizeijt
+ 11junemp_rateijt + 0
jDijt + uijt (3)
where lnwijt is the log wage of person i in group j at time t. j 2 fE;Ng denotes the group
a person is associated to, i.e. Ethnic German (E) or Native German (N). educ2ijt is a dummy
variable if someone has vocational training and similarly, educ3ijt denotes a university degree.16
We include labour-market experience (lm_exp) deﬁned as the total time of employment in Ger-
many both linearly and quadratically. The variable rel_sec_expijt is the fraction of time a
person has spent in the current branch relative to the total time he or she has worked in Ger-
many. Finally, we also included the unemployment rate in the community where the new job
starts (unemp_rateijt) to take local labour-market conditions into account.17 Dijt is a vector
of branch and time dummies.
Table 4 shows the results for the case that we restrict the coefﬁcients 4j   11j and the vector
of dummy-variable coefﬁcients 0
j to be the same for Ethnic and Native Germans. It can be seen



















*** Signiﬁcant at the 1%-level
a)Including dummies for branch
and year
from the table, that in both groups, individuals with higher education signals than those with
no vocational training, have signiﬁcantly higher wages. This difference is 6.9% for people with
vocational training and jumps to 22.2% if people have a university degree. This is in line with
our hypothesis 1 from Section 2.
Hypothesis 3 that there should be no difference between the low-qualiﬁed Ethnic and Native
16 As shown in the article by Card (2001), usually – at least when testing the human-capital theory – the education
variable is instrumented for. Unfortunately, the FEA data does not include any suitable instruments so that we are
not able to compare the coefﬁcients using different estimation methods.
17 We also instrumented this variable with its one and two months lag. This does not alter the main results.
16Germans is also conﬁrmed. The coefﬁcient for the natives in Table 4 is not signiﬁcant. This is the
case even though we have a very large sample.
There are, however, signiﬁcant differences between the wages for individuals with vocational
training and university degrees between the two groups. The medium-qualiﬁed natives have
around 4% higher wages. The difference for the highly qualiﬁed between the two groups is
much higher at around 34%. This is also in line with the hypothesis 2 from Section 2.
All other parameters for the control variables have the expected sign and are highly signiﬁcant.
For example, the wages for females are roughly 13% lower than those for males and wages
increase with ﬁrm size. Both total labour-market experience and speciﬁc experience in the cur-
rent sector exert a positive inﬂuence on the wage. However, there is a certain threshold for the
effect of total labour-market experience. Age has a positive inﬂuence. Hence, given a certain
amount of labour-market experience, individuals manage to increase their wage when they take
up new jobs at higher ages. People who commute further also receive higher wages, either as
compensation for their higher commuting costs or perhaps due to the motivation signal mentio-
ned above. Finally, an increase in the unemployment rate is associated with lower wages, a sign
that employees have poorer bargaining positions in this case. Although not shown in the table,
the regression also included 56 sector and 4 year dummies. These were jointly highly signiﬁcant,
respectively.
We performed numerous F and Wald tests with robust or clustered standard errors to see whether
the restriction of equal coefﬁcients 4j 11j and the vector of coefﬁcients 0
j is feasible for both
groups (Ethnic and Native Germans). All tests rejected this hypothesis, so that in the following,
we will concentrate on results of separate analysis for the two groups (see Table 5).18
Table 5: Estimation Results of the Unrestricted Model















*** Signiﬁcant at the 1%-level
a)Including dummies for branch and year
18 An F-Test (with homoscedastic errors) to test whether the parameters for the control variables are identical for
the two groups leads to an F-Value of 71.13 with 69 and 264,666 degrees of freedom and thus rejects the null-
hypothesis at all signiﬁcance levels. The Wald test with robust calculation of the variance-covariance matrix for
the unrestricted model leads to the same result.
17The coefﬁcients for the Ethnic Germans are similar to those from Table 4. Medium-skilled Ethnic
Germans have wages which are 6.2% higher than those of Ethnic Germans with no vocational
training. The difference between the latter group and the high-skilled Ethnic Germans is 22.5%.
For the Native Germans the differences are 12% and 53%, respectively.19 This difference is again
nearly the same as in Table 4. These ﬁndings are clearly in support of our hypothesis 1 and 2 from
Section 2, i.e., there are signiﬁcant differences between the education signals and there are large
differences between Ethnic and Native Germans with identical (formal) educational signals.
The role that past experience in the same sector as the one in which the new job starts also
differs substantially between the two groups with the effect much stronger for the Native than
the Ethnic Germans. All other control variables remain highly signiﬁcant, have the same sign and
roughly the same magnitude as was the case for the restricted regression model. Perhaps at ﬁrst
glance slightly surprising is the fact that the quadratic age term is not negative. This is probably
due to the fact that only people under 55 are included in our regressions, an age at which the
declining part of the wage-age proﬁle as is usually observed may not yet have been reached.
In a further step we check how robust our results are with respect to different speciﬁcations. The
education coefﬁcients concerning these different speciﬁcations are shown in Table 6. In the ﬁrst
line of this table we simply repeat the coefﬁcients from Table 5 for better comparability.
Table 6: Robustness Checks of Education Signals with Different Model Speciﬁcations
Ethnic Germans Native Germans
voc. training univ. degree voc. training univ. degree
Unrestr. model 0.062*** 0.225*** 0.124*** 0.534***
Linear-speciﬁcation 0.069*** 0.231*** 0.131*** 0.551***
Log-linear-speciﬁcation 0.071*** 0.226*** 0.115*** 0.523***
Including short-job-spells 0.061*** 0.221*** 0.125*** 0.528***
3-month wage 0.052*** 0.211*** 0.116*** 0.541***
3-day gap 0.059*** 0.215*** 0.118*** 0.513***
10,- Eur. limit 0.073*** 0.234*** 0.203*** 0.624***
2-year stay 0.084*** 0.280***
Robust standard errors
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1%-level
The unrestricted model includes age and labour-market experience both linearly and quadrati-
cally. Lines 2 and 3 of Table 6 show the education coefﬁcients for two different approaches using
an unchanged dataset: In the linear speciﬁcation we omit both the quadratic terms and in the
log-linear speciﬁcation we use the (natural) logarithm of age and labour-market experience as
arguments. As one can see, the general picture remains the same.
Lines 4 to 8 of Table 6 show the education coefﬁcients for robustness tests which imply variations
in the dataset. Firstly, instead of only including jobs which started in the second half of a year
19 We also calculated the coefﬁcients for foreigners. The wage differences associated with their educational signals
were always below those of the Native Germans, but well above those of the Ethnic Germans. Surprisingly, the
coefﬁcients of the foreigners were quite close to the coefﬁcients of the Native Germans and quite different to the
coefﬁcients of the Ethnic Germans. However, due to the large heterogeneities amongst the foreigners, we refrain
from presenting the results here.
18to make sure that we do not just have short jobs in our sample, we include all jobs for which we
observe the wage for up to six months in a particular year, i.e. we also include jobs which begin
and end in the same year and hence only last a maximum of six months. As can be seen from
Table 6, this only has marginal effects on the levels of the coefﬁcients and no effects on their
signiﬁcance levels.
Although we assume that often the wage changes after six months when the probation period
ends, we also tested a model speciﬁcation where the starting wage is only based on a maximum
of three months (and for the same reason as above, we only looked at jobs which started in the
ﬁnal three months of a year). Again, there are only small effects on the education coefﬁcients.
The next robustness check which we perform is to vary the number of days that must be between
two jobs one person has. We argued above that a gap of one day should be sufﬁcient to be
able to ﬁlter out those people changing jobs within one company from those starting new jobs
at new companies. To test whether our results depend on this assumption, we also include the
results when we increase this gap to three days. This reduces the coefﬁcients slightly but does
not change any of our main ﬁndings or the signiﬁcance levels of the coefﬁcients.
As mentioned in Section 3, in the unrestricted model we omit spells with starting wages below
20,- e from our analysis. In a further robustness check, we lower this wage limit and only omit
new jobs with starting wages under 10,- e. Here we observe upward differences of the education
coefﬁcients particularly for Native Germans. This is caused by the fact that because of lowering
the wage limit the share of people without vocational training increases substantially especially
for Native Germans, i.e. for Native Germans from 14.0% to 39.7% and for Ethnic Germans from
30.7% to 42.6%.
It could be argued that Ethnic Germans need a certain amount of time once they have arrived in
Germany to orientate themselves. To take this fact into account, in the last robustness modiﬁ-
cation of the unrestricted model we only looked at spells of Ethnic Germans whose ﬁrst record
in the IEB is at least two years old. It can be seen that both education coefﬁcients do indeed
increase, but are still well below the values for Native Germans.
All in all, the additional regression results presented in Table 6 show that the basic scenario
presented before is very robust. Increasing coefﬁcients for both Ethnic and Native Germans occur
especially if jobs with starting wages from 10,- e are included. In addition, only including those
Ethnic Germans which have been in Germany for at least two years also leads to an increase in
their education coefﬁcients. However, even in these cases, the empirical results still conﬁrm the
theoretical hypothesis.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyses the effects of education signals for Ethnic Germans and Germans without a
migration background (“Native Germans”). Ethnic Germans are an important immigration group
in Germany for two reasons: First, with roughly 2.5 million migrating to Germany between 1990
and 2004, they represent a “large” immigration group. Second, due to their German roots, they
19gain German citizenship upon migration into Germany and hence – unlike other groups of mi-
grants – unrestricted access to the German labour market.
We base our analysis on a sorting model with productivity enhancing effects of education. Hence,
wedonottestwhetherthesortingorhuman-capitaltheoryisvalid. Instead, wecomparewhether
this signalling value differs signiﬁcantly between a distinct group of migrants and non-migrants
in the German labour market. We ﬁrst show theoretically that only a separating equilibrium can
exist. This has several implications for our empirical analysis. First, we expect signiﬁcant diffe-
rences between the effects of low-, medium- and high educational signals on wages irrespective
of whether they are Ethnic or Native Germans. Second, if employers associate a lower produc-
tivity with foreign degrees than for degrees obtained in the home country, then a person with a
degree from abroad will receive a lower wage than a person with the same formal degree stem-
ming from the home country. Third, if it is true that low-skilled occupations do not require formal
qualiﬁcations, we expect that the wages associated with low educational signal individuals be
the same. Fourth and ﬁnally, if the former two hypothesis hold, then the difference in the coef-
ﬁcients between low- and high-skilled Native Germans should be higher than the corresponding
difference for the Ethnic Germans.
As most datasets do not allow us to identify Ethnic Germans as they only record nationality, we
test these hypothesis using a completely new and extremely rich dataset based on administra-
tive data from the German Federal Employment Agency. We ﬁnd empirical support for all four
hypothesis. In addition, we test how robust our conclusions are with respect to different model
speciﬁcations and econometric methods. All four hypothesis continue to hold, irrespective of
which variation we tried.
Although many papers have shown that migrants, deﬁned as foreigners, generally fare less well
on the German labour market than natives do, this paper clearly highlights the fact that this also
holds for one group of migrants which has not been analysed in as much detail and which has
completely unrestricted access to the German labour market.
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